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Alan Bogg*  “Labour Law is a Subset of Employment Law”
 Revisited
This article revisits the arguments in Brian Langille’s seminal law review article, “Labour 
Law is a Subset of Employment Law.” Langille’s article was based upon two main claims: 
(a) that (individual) employment law should be understood as the “set” and (collective) 
labour law the “subset” of employment law (the primacy of employment law); (b) that 
“public values” have priority over “private values” in the regulation of work (the primacy 
of public values). These two claims were presented as mutually reinforcing in “Subset.” 
Drawing on specific examples from UK and Canadian law, this article endorses the first 
claim but rejects the second. Public and private values intersect in a multiplicity of ways. 
It is too reductive to accord primacy to the “public”or the “private.” Employment law has 
always been a hybrid discipline shaped by public and private law.
Dans le présent article, nous reprenons les arguments avancés dans le fameux article 
de Brian Langille, « Labour Law is a Subset of Employment Law .» Cet article présentait 
deux arguments principaux : a) que le droit de l’emploi (individuel) doit être compris 
comme « l’ensemble » et le droit du travail (collectif) comme le « sous-ensemble » 
du droit de l’emploi (la primauté étant accordée au droit de l’emploi); b) que les 
« valeurs publiques » ont la priorité sur les « valeurs privées » dans la réglementation 
du travail (la primauté étant accordée aux valeurs publiques). Ces deux revendications 
ont été présentées comme se renforçant mutuellement dans le « sous-ensemble .» 
En s’appuyant sur des exemples spécifiques du droit britannique et canadien, nous 
appuyons dans le présent article le premier argument mais rejetons le second. Les 
valeurs publiques et privées se croisent de multiples façons. Il est trop réducteur 
d’accorder la primauté au « public » ou au « privé .» Le droit de l’emploi travail a 
toujours été une discipline hybride façonnée par le droit public et le droit privé.
* Professor of Labour Law, University of Bristol. I am very grateful to Bruce Archibald for 
organizing this special issue, to two anonymous referees for helpful comments, and to Brian Langille 
for having been such an interesting, supportive and generous interlocutor over many years. We have 
often disagreed, but the disagreements have always been a friendly source of pleasure and illumination. 
All errors are my own responsibility.
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Introduction
When I was eight years old, the year that one of Brian Langille’s debut 
pieces “Labour Law is a Subset of Employment Law” (“Subset”) was 
published,1 I watched the horror film Salem’s Lot furtively through the 
crack in a door left ajar by my mother. The film was terrifying. It was 
an experience that stayed with me. Some decades later, I mustered the 
courage to watch it again. Revisiting the film was a mistake. What had 
seemed scary now appeared silly. In the intervening years, the terror had 
dissipated. That is always the danger with revisiting treasured things. 
Creative works sometimes make best sense in a particular time and place. 
They may not age well.
Since 1981, there have been tectonic shifts in the world of work. This 
has had a significant impact on our ways of understanding the discipline 
of labour law itself, its normative goals and its regulatory instruments, and 
its relationship with other compartments of the law. Have the arguments in 
“Subset” endured so that they remain relevant and important today? 
There are two basic claims in “Subset.” First, that (individual) 
employment law should be understood as the “set” and (collective) labour 
law the “subset” of employment law. This ordering gives employment 
law structural priority over labour law. Second, that “public values” have 
priority over “private values” in the regulation of work. Let us call these 
arguments “the primacy of employment law” and “the primacy of public 
values” respectively. 
There is a great deal that needs unpacking here, and that will be 
undertaken in section I. This section elucidates some of the arguments 
1. Brian Langille, “Labour Law is a Subset of Employment Law” (1981) 31 UTLJ 200.
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used by Langille to give structural priority to employment law as the “set,” 
with labour law its “subset.” Some of those arguments are “pedagogical,” 
based in the idea that there is an expositional virtue in according structural 
priority to employment law. I suggest that these “pedagogical” arguments 
are in fact rather weak and bound up with the concerns of a particular time 
and place. They need to be supplemented by normative arguments.
Once we shift from the “pedagogical” to more normative ground, 
some of the main arguments of “Subset” have certainly endured. In 
particular, the normative arguments associated with “the primacy of 
employment law” have endured well (though at the time they were made, 
these arguments would have been regarded as provocative, heretical even). 
Section II investigates these arguments.  What I have called “the primacy 
of employment law” highlights the indispensable role of individual rights 
in supporting collective structures and institutions. These individual 
entitlements have become increasingly important in new forms of work 
such as gig work, where established trade union organization may not yet 
have taken root. “Subset” is also attentive to the significance of enforcement 
regimes in understanding the conceptual structure of employment law. I 
build upon Langille’s discussion of enforcement in section III. Today, 
enforcement in employment law is one of the most important regulatory 
issues, at the heart of our disciplinary reflections, and “Subset” analysed 
employment standards enforcement powerfully and presciently. 
I am less persuaded by Langille’s argument for “the primacy of public 
values,” though I imagine this claim would have been regarded as rather 
less controversial than “the primacy of employment law” at the time it was 
made. The distinction and comparison between public and private values 
is far too complex to be reducible to a single metric, not least because there 
are likely to be many public and private values at stake. By relegating 
“private values,” we run the risk of overlooking the contributions that 
private law doctrines and private law theory can make in improving the 
lives of workers. Employment lawyers have tended to be sceptical about 
private law as a technique for regulating work. Indeed, the private law 
of contract was regarded as part of the regulatory problem. Historically, 
contract law was an object of criticism. It was widely regarded as incapable 
of regulating the personal work relation to protect the worker’s dignity 
in circumstances of unequal bargaining power. This scepticism about 
private law provided the justification for a special autonomous regime 
of regulation—“labour law” or “industrial law” as it was first known—to 
counteract the inequality of power that was otherwise obscured by the 
doctrines of general private law. Recent developments in the enforcement 
of labour rights suggest that “the primacy of public values” perspective 
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has now outlived its usefulness. I conclude by suggesting that the spirit of 
“Subset” would be better served by a rapprochement of the “public” and 
the “private,” which reflects the deep character of employment law as a 
hybrid discipline of both public and private law.
I. “Labour Law is a Subset of Employment Law”
“Subset” provides a basic enquiry into the coherence of a legal discipline: 
how should we decide “whether a useful chunk of reality has been carved 
out for examination?”2 “Subset” was one of Brian Langille’s debut pieces, 
but it is a question that has recurred in his impressive body of work across 
four decades of scholarly reflection. The problem of disciplinary coherence 
is rarely treated as such a pressing problem in the domains of contract, 
tort, unjust enrichment and the other basic compartments of private law. 
Certainly, there are deep disagreements about the best theoretical account 
of these domains. There is usually less controversy over whether “contract 
law” or “law of torts” is an appropriate legal domain in the first place. Or 
indeed whether a legal norm is properly described as a contract norm, or 
a tort norm, and so forth.3 These matters are usually taken as relatively 
uncontroversial, enabling the scholar to proceed to more interesting 
questions about whether private law disciplines have an internal structure, 
or if private law is intelligible in the light of instrumental or external 
goals, or whether we should understand the basic structure of private law 
in terms of rights (or some other fundamental legal category). Of course, 
appearances can sometimes be misleading. Critical perspectives on the 
basic domains of private law often interrogate their parameters more 
vigorously, identifying the ways in which supposedly neutral private law 
principles obscure the role of contract law in constituting, distributing, 
enabling, or impeding the exercise of power in ostensibly “private” 
relations. This deconstructive turn in scholarship may be effective in 
debunking the idea that private law categories are reducible to a small 
set of explanatory norms or principles. Yet these critical reflections rarely 
penetrate the basic coherence assumption that envelops the compartments 
of private law in doctrinally-oriented scholarship and legal practice.
By contrast, the coherence problem is more visible in “contextual” legal 
disciplines such as labour law, or medical law, or family law. This is because 
scholars in these domains face a different organizational problem to the 
2. Ibid at 200.
3. Though compare discrimination law, and Khaitan’s enquiry into the identity of discrimination 
norms: see Tarunabh Khaitan, “Prelude to a Theory of Discrimination Law” in Deborah Hellman & 
Sophia Moreau, eds, Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014).
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private lawyers. They must identify the relevant spheres of social life that 
are sufficiently important to warrant the systemization of different norms 
drawn from (say) contract, tort, property law, or public law. In this respect, 
these contextual disciplines are second-order disciplines, constructing 
new norm-systems out of more basic first-order disciplinary building-
blocks. Families, work, and medicine are now well-settled contextual 
domains. Perhaps this reflects the importance of these contexts to human 
flourishing (and, more importantly, the damage to human flourishing that 
results when things go wrong in families, work, and medicine).4 Even if 
we take “work” as our relevant context as a “useful chunk of reality,” there 
are many different ways of carving it up. Are we concerned with labour 
as an activity or employment as a relation? Should we expand our focus 
and examine the “law of the labour market” or “work law?”5 Perhaps we 
should integrate an examination of anti-discrimination law and labour law 
to expose the deeper gendered and racialized connections between these 
two spheres?6 Or maybe “work” itself is too limiting so that we should 
organize our norms in a new discipline of the “law of private resistance,” 
which examines multiple sites of private domination in modern life such 
as employment and housing?7 
Of course, the scholar has the luxury of eclecticism. As Kit Barker 
has emphasized, the demarcation of legal phenomena “depends entirely 
upon how legislators, adjudicators, legal scholars and other participants 
in legal systems think about these categories and, in particular, upon 
whether or not they regard the distinction in question as useful in 
illuminating the system’s practices.”8 The friction between these different 
contextual demarcations—work, employment, labour market, productive 
and reproductive labour, private domination—might be intellectually 
productive in exposing phenomena that might otherwise remain hidden. 
The work of the world (and litigating that in the courts) will continue to 
be done however scholars decide to formulate contesting visions of legal 
4. For a discussion of “contextual” legal disciplines in these terms, see Alan L Bogg, “Labour, Love 
and Futility: Philosophical Perspectives on Labour Law” (2017) 33:1 Intl J Comp Lab L & Ind Rel 7.
5. On the “law of the labour market,” see Simon Deakin & Frank Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour 
Market (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). On “work law,” see Noah D Zatz, “Does Work Law 
have a Future if the Labor Market Does Not?” (2016) 91:3 Chicago-Kent L Rev 1081.
6. Richard Michael Fischl, “Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American Work Law” (2007) 
28:1 BJELL 163.
7. For a thought-provoking discussion in these terms, see Harry Arthurs, “Labor Law as the Law of 
Economic Subordination and Resistance: A Thought Experiment” (2013) 34:3 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 
585.
8. Kit Barker, “Private law: Key encounters with public law” in Kit Barker & Darryn Jensen, eds, 
Private Law: Key Encounters with Public Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 3 at 
19.
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reality. We aren’t required to sign up to a specific disciplinary vision on 
an exclusive or permanent basis, and some experimentation and flexibility 
could well be interesting and productive.
In “Subset,” Langille is not so concerned with this problem of context. 
The relevant bit of the world is described as the “employment relationship” 
(and Langille seems fairly relaxed about how to identify it). Were he to write 
this piece today, he might be less relaxed about this. The last thirty years 
have been marked by a growing sense of disenchantment that many work 
relations are falling outside the “employment relationship” but represent 
forms of self-employment that are highly precarious. Be that as it may, in 
1981 his dominant focus was on how to organize and systemize the legal 
norms that regulate the employment relationship so that they form a coherent 
whole. As the title of the article suggests, Langille’s enquiry is directed at 
the relationship between two bodies of law, “employment law” and “labour 
law,” and the extent to which these two bodies of law can be treated as an 
integrated and coherent set of norms. For Langille, “employment law” 
describes the “law for the unorganized.”9 It encompasses a wide range of 
statutory entitlements that regulate the working conditions of individual 
employees: minimum wage, restrictions on hours of work, overtime rates, 
paid holidays, and “just cause” dismissal protections. This is what Lord 
Wedderburn once famously described in the UK context as the “floor of 
rights.”10 It is focused upon individual statutory entitlements, allocated 
to individual employees, and enforceable in courts or specialist tribunals 
regardless of union membership or collective bargaining. “Labour law,” 
by contrast, is the “law for the organized.” This encompasses the norms 
and institutions of collective labour relations, administered by specialist 
labour boards and labour arbitrators, interpreting autonomous legal 
concepts such as “bargaining units” and “good faith bargaining.” While 
Langille is anxious to avoid the charge that his argument is “a cry for 
individual over collective rights,”11 it is easy to see how the elevation of 
“employment law” as the general category (and “labour law” its “subset”) 
creates the impression.
This analytical enquiry into a reconciliation between two discrete 
bodies of norms has greater juridical resonance in the North American 
context. In contrast to the UK, both the US and Canada were (and 
remain) highly juridified legal systems, especially at the collective level. 
Consequently, there was a distinctive, extensive and relatively autonomous 
9. Langille, supra note 1 at 200.
10. Lord Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law, 2nd ed (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1971) at 39.
11. Langille, supra note 1 at 230.
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body of legal norms and adjudicative institutions, regulating trade union 
organization, certification for collective bargaining, the administration 
of collective agreements, and the right to strike. In the UK, by contrast, 
collective bargaining law was lightly juridified and “individual employment 
law” emerged as a substantial body of norms only in the mid-1970s.12 
In modern UK treatises in the post-war period, it was conventional to 
organize all norms within a single discipline called “labour law.”13 Labour 
law encompassed both collective and individual norms, but with priority 
accorded to collective topics such as collective bargaining, collective 
agreements, and the right to strike. The choice of nomenclature, favouring 
“labour law” over “employment law,” was generally understood as a 
code signalling an ideological disposition favouring worker-protective 
purposes. The pragmatist orientation of UK labour law might well have 
regarded structural questions about the organization of legal norms as an 
irritating scholastic distraction from the serious business of making the 
world of work a better place. Let the focus be on organizing workers, 
not legal norms. In certain respects, therefore, Langille’s preoccupation 
in “Subset” could be viewed as a relatively parochial enterprise that was 
relevant to North American labour lawyers and rather peripheral in the UK 
context.
Langille’s claim that labour law is a “subset” of employment law 
would also have been regarded as a highly provocative one, certainly to 
UK lawyers. To modern eyes, the provocation is even more acute. For to 
describe (collective) “labour law” as a “subset” of the more fundamental 
juridical category of (individual) “employment law” brings with it 
the suspicion that values of solidarity are being undermined by more 
individualistic values. In short, does the descriptor “subset” denote a 
political judgement that downgrades the collective dimensions of working 
life? In an era of declining unionization, it is easy to see how this might be 
a neuralgic point for labour lawyers.
Before we leap to condemnation, we should note Langille’s 
characterization of employment law as the law for the unorganized “have-
nots.” In other words, these statutory norms were particularly important for 
the most marginalized and precarious workers left outside the system of 
collective bargaining coverage. For this reason, Langille’s proposed shift 
in methodological priorities could be understood as a way of extending 
12. This, of course, is the central point of “collective laissez-faire” as a juridical description of 
British labour law, a term coined by Otto Kahn-Freund and developed by Wedderburn. For a discussion 
of the trials and tribulations of collective laissez-faire, see Alan Bogg, “The Hero’s Journey: Lord 
Wedderburn and the ‘Political Constitution’ of Labour Law” (2015) 44:3 Indus LJ 299. 
13. See eg Simon Deakin & Gillian Morris, Labour Law, 6th ed (Oxford: Hart, 2012).
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the locus of solidarity to encompass the most disadvantaged workers in 
the labour market who might otherwise disappear as subjects of protective 
labour law. On this view, the “subset” argument might be the fulfilment of 
labour law’s egalitarian mission, not its abnegation. 
The devaluation of the collective dimension in work relations has 
come to pass in recent decades in many countries, although that decline 
can hardly be attributed to the activities of labour law scholars postulating 
relations between norm-types.14 The “Subset” thesis, according priority 
to norms for individuals, also seems to subvert the conventional view of 
historical legal development. On this view, the emergence of collective 
organization and political voice generated democratic pressures to 
introduce worker-protective legislation for individual employees. The 
enactment of individual entitlements by legislators is rarely an intellectual 
response to a good philosophical argument about the theory of justice. It is 
a response to collective mobilization by trade unions operating as political 
pressure groups in the legislative process. By the same token, the decline 
in collective strength has opened the way for a politics of deregulation. In 
short, the stability of individual employment law has always depended upon 
robust collective organization in the workplace and polity.15 By presenting 
employment law as the “set,” there is a danger that we obscure this vital 
aspect of the collective-individual interaction: the political dependence of 
individual rights on collective worker strength in the legislative process. 
This is an important reminder that intellectual enquiries into disciplinary 
coherence are no substitute for empirically-grounded enquiries into the 
political and industrial dynamics of labour power in workplaces and 
legislatures. These reservations about downgrading the “collective” at an 
intellectual level should not be dismissed lightly. This downgrading would 
be music to the ears of many powerful corporate actors. 
How relevant is Langille’s structural claim to labour lawyers today? 
We can distinguish between “pedagogic” and “normative” arguments. I 
would suggest that the “normative” arguments have endured better than 
the “pedagogic” ones.16 Let us begin by considering the “pedagogic” 
arguments. By “pedagogic,” Langille is suggesting that the dominance of 
“labour law” in the Canadian legal academy had led to the marginalization 
of employment law as a worthy object of legal study. This distorted the 
14. It is a fact that has often been at the centre of “crisis” literature on the extinction of labour law as 
a discipline. See eg Cynthia L Estlund, “The Death of Labor Law?” (2006) 2 Annual Rev Soc Science 
105 [“The Death of Labour Law”].
15. Alan Bogg & Ruth Dukes, “The Contract of Employment and Collective Labour Law” in Mark 
Freedland, ed, The Contract of Employment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 96.
16. Langille, supra note 1 at 201.
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practical importance of employment law for a growing number of Canadian 
employees, given that the many of those employees fell outside collective 
bargaining at the time the piece was written. Restoring the scholarly 
prestige of “employment law” prevented the neglect of a practically 
important body of law, and one that was important to the most precarious 
workers in the labour market. This restoration also enabled scholars to 
examine the intersections between individual and collective legal norms. 
This binocular vision could be important where, for example, an arbitrator 
was required to interpret a collective agreement in the light of employment 
statutes relevant to the individual dispute. As such, there is an expositional 
virtue in centring the core of the discipline on “employment law” and its 
individual rights.
These “pedagogic” arguments were undoubtedly important in 
retrieving the “floor of rights” from intellectual obscurity in the UK too. 
In a similarly “pedagogic” vein, Hugh Collins famously criticized the 
dangers of “closure” in the disciplinary framing of UK labour law.17 The 
intellectual dominance of “collective laissez-faire,” rooted in a sociological 
orientation focused on the institutions and practices of collective labour 
relations, inevitably generated criteria of importance and significance in 
organizing the legal materials.18 These criteria marginalized alternative 
perspectives on legal developments, for example theories of individual 
political and social rights in the workplace.19 Collins’ intervention was an 
important  reminder that value judgements always underlie the selection 
and organization of legal materials. Judgements of importance are 
normative, and those judgements are inescapable once we are organizing 
legal norms into a coherent and intelligible structure. Our duty as scholars 
is to be methodologically explicit in making those evaluative choices.20 We 
should be particularly sensitive to what is positioned on the periphery of 
the discipline, and the social and political consequences of that marginality.
Few would deny that individual employment law should be taken 
seriously as a compartment of the law regulating work relations. Yet 
its marginalization could be countered by treating “labour law” and 
“employment law” as co-equal elements of a law of work relations or “work 
17. Hugh Collins, “The Productive Disintegration of Labour Law” (1997) 26:4 Indus LJ 295.
18. Ibid at 301.
19. Ibid at 304-306.
20. Must those guiding values be moral? Or is it possible for theory-construction to be guided only 
by “epistemic” values such as simplicity or charity? Both involve “normative” considerations. For 
further discussion, see Brian Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism 
and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), especially chapters 1, 
6.
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law.” Or even by treating “employment law” as a “subset” of “labour law.” 
That would retrieve employment law from relative obscurity by locating it 
within the scholarly perimeter, and this would counter the tendency toward 
“overly compartmentalized thinking” that Langille rightly criticizes.21 In 
short, pedagogic values are agnostic on whether we should treat labour law 
as a “subset” of “employment law” or vice versa. They simply advocate 
taking employment law seriously as a body of norms, without specifying 
how it should be related structurally to labour law.
Nor have these pedagogic considerations remained stable over time. 
In 2020, we are now facing the opposite of the pedagogic problems that 
Langille was grappling with in 1981. In an era of dwindling trade union 
membership and collective bargaining in precipitous decline, it is now 
the collective side of the discipline that faces the existential threat to its 
viability as an area of scholarly enquiry. For example, Cynthia Estlund has 
observed that “the health and vitality of labor law, both as a body of law 
and as a field of scholarly enquiry, hinges on the vitality of the institutions 
that define labor law: labor unions and collective bargaining. Therein lies 
the problem.”22 Nor is the threat of intellectual extinction confined to US 
scholarship, with the Australian labour lawyer Richard Mitchell asking 
in a similar vein, “Does one continue to focus on the details of collective 
bargaining, trade unions, strike law and so on when these do no not reflect 
the reality of how labour markets are operating?”23 In leading textbooks in 
the UK, it is now common for chapters on collective topics to be published 
“online” and separately from the printed text covering more familiar topics 
such as the contract of employment, employment status, and dismissal. 
This would have been unthinkable a generation ago. There is also a dearth 
of up-to-date specialist textbooks on collective labour law. In this way, 
the problem of intellectual marginalization has flipped in the decades that 
followed the publication of “Subset.” Labour law is now the endangered 
species in the legal academy. Few students may have ever encountered a 
trade union or a collective agreement, and fewer judges handling labour 
cases in the appellate courts have a deep understanding of the distinctive 
logic of collective action. By treating (collective) labour law as a “subset” 
at the margins, are we being complicit in its demise? And why should we 
care? 
21. Langille, supra note 1 at 201.
22. Estlund, “The Death of Labour Law,” supra note 14 at 105.
23. Richard Mitchell, “Where are We Going in Labour Law? Some Thoughts on a Field of 
Scholarship and policy in process of change” (2011) 24 Austl J Lab L 45 at 59.
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One answer is provided by John Gardner, who has recently praised 
the “precarious equilibrium” that existed between “labour law” and 
“employment law” in the early post-war period, particularly as represented 
in the work of Otto Kahn-Freund.24 According to Gardner, “the shift marked 
by the re-branding of ‘labour law’ as ‘employment law’” may symbolize 
a process of tragic proportions, whereby work has been so degraded 
through its hyper-contractualization that it is no longer capable of being 
an integral part of a flourishing life.25 Nomenclature and the disciplinary 
organization of legal norms matter because they reflexively shape how we 
view work, how we demarcate it from non-work, and how we regulate it 
through law. This indicates a role for “beneficial moral consequences” as 
a criterion for determining how to organize legal norms into a coherent 
grouping.26 It has already been suggested that there are a range of ways 
in which the legal norms regulating work might be organized into a 
coherent set. The “beneficial moral consequences” thesis would direct us 
to favour models that have beneficial moral consequences.  For example, 
by choosing a disciplinary model that continues to emphasize collective 
norms despite the fact that trade union membership is in decline, this could 
give the value of solidarity appropriate recognition in public discourse 
about work. This value might otherwise be marginalized or eclipsed. Or by 
formulating the discipline around the “law of work” rather than the “law of 
employment” this might lead judges and legislators to treat non-standard 
work arrangements as more readily within the scope of protective statutes. 
A world in which solidarity is taken more seriously, or a world in which 
more workers are protected from exploitation, is a better world. To the 
extent that some models of legal reality can lead to better moral outcomes, 
we have a normative reason for preferring those models.
By now, we have left the pedagogic arguments long behind. Without 
the support of normative arguments, such as the “beneficial moral 
consequences” thesis, pedagogic arguments provide only weak support 
for the “subset” approach. Indeed, Langille himself pursues more 
normative arguments in his own work, and it is here that we find the main 
intellectual justification for his “subset” approach. According to Langille, 
employment law must be understood as based upon a moral foundation. As 
24. John Gardner, “The Contractualization of Labour Law” in Hugh Collins, Gillian Lester, & 
Virginia Mantouvalou, eds, Philosophical Foundations of Labour Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2018) 33.
25. Ibid at 34.
26. For an outline and critique of the “beneficial moral consequences” methodological thesis, see 
Julie Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Theory (Oxford: Hart, 2001).
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he later argued, employment law depends upon a “theory of justice.”27 In 
“Subset,” this theory of justice was closely based upon Ronald Dworkin’s 
account of liberal equality in Taking Rights Seriously, a book that had 
been published only a few years before in 1977.28 Building on Dworkin’s 
theory, Langille argues that citizens have a right to equal concern and 
respect. This requires that “modern democratic states…provide and 
protect the liberties of its citizens while at the same time providing a 
minimum set of social conditions.”29 Given the importance of employment 
to the identity, worth and self-esteem of citizens, employment law is a 
fundamental legal mechanism for securing liberal equality for citizens. 
“Respect” norms ensure that citizens enjoy the capacity to formulate and 
pursue a conception of the good; this would include the protection of 
basic rights and liberties in the workplace. “Concern” norms ensure that 
citizens are provided with a social and economic minimum enabling them 
to live a dignified life, such as a decent wage and decent working time. For 
Langille, this right to equal concern and respect positions “employment 
law” as the set and “labour law” as the “subset.” On his argument, this 
also means that “public values” have priority over “private values” in the 
regulation of employment. 
This claim that “public values” have priority over “private values” 
raises many questions. How do we distinguish public and private values? 
Are there multiple values in both domains? Is it the case that any public 
value has decisive weight whenever it runs up against any private value? 
Do we identify values as “public” whenever they are implemented in a 
statute or might statutes sometimes implement “private” values too? 
Langille argues that the prioritization of “public values” supports the 
rejection of “freedom of contract” for individuals in an employment 
relationship. This is because “inequality of bargaining power” means that 
individual employment contracts rarely secure “concern” and “respect” 
for employees in the workplace. “Public values” also impose limits on 
the “autonomy” of voluntary collective bargaining. This is because public 
policies expressed in employment statutes should (sometimes) override 
“free” collective bargaining. 
Here we arrive at the real crux of the “Subset” thesis. Imagine a 
collective agreement implements a pay structure that is racially or sexually 
discriminatory. Such an agreement would fail to secure a minimum level 
27. Brian Langille, “Labour Law’s Theory of Justice” in Guy Davidov & Brian Langille, eds, The 
Idea of Labour Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 104.
28. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 
1997).
29. Langille, supra note 1 at 201.
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of “respect” for employees. The right to equal concern and respect would 
justify the vindication of the public values of the liberal community as 
reflected in human rights or anti-discrimination legislation.30 The public 
values, as expressed in this legislation, should override the discriminatory 
terms in the collective agreement. Or the collective agreement deviates 
from the minimum level of “concern” as enacted in the statutory floor of 
rights by specifying a level of pay below the statutory minimum. Liberal 
equality demands that the contracting out of statutory protections should 
be restricted.31 At the very least, Langille argues that employees covered 
by collective agreements should not be exempted from the coverage of 
statutory minimum entitlements.32 He also argues that arbitrators should 
consider the effects of employment statutes in the interpretation and 
enforcement of collective agreements.33 Since the minimum threshold of 
concern and respect was set by the “floor of rights,” collective bargaining 
should not depart from that threshold. This is why labour law is the subset, 
and employment law the set.34 Employment law sets the basic minimum 
of a dignified working life for all employees, and labour law provides 
procedural structures that empower employees to bargain collectively and 
secure advantages beyond the statutory floor.
Are these concerns still relevant? The problem of integrating 
employment statutes into the private arbitration of collective agreements 
seems a rather quaint distraction from the rise of Gig work, algorithmic 
management, the displacement of human work by robots, the collapse of 
collective bargaining in the private sector, and a growing “precariat.” In 
an era where collective bargaining is dwindling to vanishing point in the 
private sector, and neoliberal governments are dismantling the statutory 
floor of rights, do the problems animating “Subset” in 1981 still resonate? 
There are two aspects of “Subset” that speak powerfully to our 
current challenges. The first aspect is Langille’s identification of certain 
fundamental non-derogable entitlements for individuals, such as a right 
to refuse work in situations of risk to health and safety. Such “refusal of 
work” provisions have become important in the context of COVID-19 
and the hasty implementation of “return to work” policies of national 
30. Ibid at 214-215.
31. Ibid at 215-217.
32. Ibid at 217.
33. Ibid at 221-226.
34. The limits of the “autonomy” of collective bargaining, and the extent to which pluralist bargaining 
should be restricted in favour of the common good, was an acute concern in debates around collective 
laissez-faire in the 1960s and 1970s. See, further, Alan Bogg, The Democratic Aspects of Trade Union 
Recognition (Oxford: Hart, 2009), chapter 2.
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governments. As collective structures and institutions have degraded over 
time, might there be other fundamental individual entitlements? And could 
such entitlements provide opportunities for collective renewal? If so, could 
these fundamental entitlements constitute an (individual) “employment 
law” foundation for a revitalized (collective) “labour law?”
The second aspect is in Langille’s emphasis on public enforcement, 
effective remedies, and institutional structures in employment law. The 
involvement of public agencies in supporting the enforcement of individual 
rights disrupts conventional understandings of the “private” and “public” 
in employment law. In both Canadian and UK law, the issue of effective 
enforcement is now at the top of the scholarly and public policy agenda. 
The crisis of enforcement has played out differently across jurisdictions. In 
North America, the focus has been on the use of private arbitration clauses 
to circumvent public adjudication in public courts. In the UK, concern 
has centred on economic impediments to claimants’ access to courts, for 
example through the imposition of excessive court fees. There has also 
been a renewed interest in enforcement through public agencies, with 
individual remedies often ill-suited to tackling systemic problems such as 
“wage theft” and under-payment of national minimum wage entitlements. 
Let us examine each aspect in turn.
II. The “Individual” and “Collective” in employment law: Employment 
law as a basic foundation of labour law
In “Subset,” Langille discusses the Canada Labour Code provision that 
provides that an individual employee has a right to refuse work where 
there is reasonable cause to believe that: “(a) the use or operation of a 
machine, device or thing would constitute an imminent danger to the 
safety or health of himself or another employee, or (b) a condition exists 
in any place that would constitute an imminent danger to his own safety 
or health.”35 This “right to refuse” is operative until a safety officer has 
determined that there is no “imminent danger.” The employee cannot be 
disciplined by the employer for exercising the “right to refuse,” and the 
Canada Labour Relations Board has the power to reinstate an employee 
who is dismissed for exercising the right.36 
The fundamental nature of this right is reflected in its enforcement 
regime. It is separated from the general provisions on grievance arbitration. 
Consequently, a trade union cannot waive the right on the employee’s 
35. Langille, supra note 1 at 209, referring to the Canada Labour Code, RSC 1985, c L-2, s 82. 1 (1) 
(now s 128).
36. Langille, supra note 1 at 209.
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behalf.37 This means that “this very basic right” cannot be “lost in the 
shuffle of the duty of fair representation.”38 In the terminology of modern 
private law theory, the primary right (to refuse work) is supported by a 
legal power vested in the primary right-holder (the refusing employee) 
to pursue a remedy in a public forum. Her legal power to seek redress 
cannot be overridden by an intervening third party, such as a trade union. 
Interestingly, this “right to refuse work” is also specified in the recent 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 190 concerning the 
Elimination of Violence and Harassment in the World of Work.39  Article 
10 (g) provides that “workers have the right to remove themselves from a 
work situation which they have reasonable justification to believe presents 
an imminent and serious danger to life, health or safety due to violence and 
harassment, without suffering retaliation or other undue consequences.”40
Langille argues that the “right to refuse” provides security of 
employment to an employee who acts upon what is perhaps one of the 
most fundamental of all an employee’s concerns—his or her own health 
and safety as well as that of others. This is one of the most fundamental 
rights in employment law, connected to the basic right to life and bodily 
integrity. Should the labour code’s “right to refuse” be understood as a 
“job security” right? Or as an “occupational health and safety” right? 
Let me make another suggestion. The true significance of the “right to 
refuse” is that it can be understood as a protean right to strike, with strong 
individual protections against employer retaliation. Are there imminent 
risks to other fundamental interests that would justify an extension of this 
“right to refuse?” The ILO Convention on violence and harassment at work 
suggests a broad conceptualization of health and safety. Should the “right 
to refuse” extend to other “basic liberties” such as non-discrimination 
or freedom of expression in the workplace?41 And where individual 
employees are engaged in a “basic liberties” strike of this kind, should this 
be treated as a non-waivable core that is not subject to collectively agreed 
peace obligations?42 Beyond the “right to strike,” we can enquire more 
generally into the scope for individual rights to provide the basic building 
37. Ibid at 229.
38. Ibid.
39. International Labour Organization, Violence and Harassment Convention, 2019 (No 190); 
International Labour Organization, Violence and Harassment Recommendation, 2019 (No 206).
40. Ibid.
41. For a discussion and defense of a “basic liberties strike” based in a republican theory of non-
domination, see Alan Bogg & Cynthia Estlund, “The Right to Strike and Contestatory Citizenship” in 
Hugh Collins, Gillian Lester & Virginia Mantouvalou, eds, Philosophical Foundations of Labour Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018) 229.
42. Ibid at 247-249.
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blocks for “collective” rights such as the right to collective bargaining.43 
“Labour law is a subset of employment law” is a formula that highlights 
how individual entitlements provide building blocks for collective norms 
and institutions. In an era of persistent decline for collective bargaining, 
and with it the atrophy of “labour law” itself, the role of individual 
entitlements in supporting collective action in new forms of precarious 
work is of fundamental practical importance.
At the most basic level some individual employment rights, such as 
general protection from unjust dismissal, support a culture of contestation 
in the workplace so that individual employees will feel less inhibited 
in their expressive activities.44 This culture of contestation may lead 
to more developed forms of collective organization. Even within the 
collective domain of labour law, individual rights such as the right not to 
be victimized for trade union membership or activities provide a crucial 
underpinning to the collective “right to organize.”45 Elements of the 
“individual” and “collective” are blended differently in different labour 
law systems. The most basic enquiry is the identity of the right-holder: is 
it an individual right for employees, a group right vested in the trade union 
itself, or a composite right for individuals and their trade unions? Once 
the primary right has been allocated, we must then decide whether legal 
rules should give standing to third parties, such as trade unions or public 
officials, to enforce individual rights on behalf of the right-holder. In 
certain circumstances, the third party might even enjoy a normative power 
to waive those primary rights. Where there are wide standing rules, giving 
normative powers to trade unions or public officials to enforce the primary 
right on the individual’s behalf, this gives a strong public dimension to 
the enforcement of rights. Careful attention to these different axes in the 
architecture of rights highlights the rich variety of models in the “right to 
organize” in different legal systems. A brief examination of the UK, the 
US and Canada demonstrates this variety.
The UK model is strongly individualistic. Its freedom of association 
rights are “bipolar” in form, and they resemble the basic structure of a 
private law right.46 This is because the right contemplates a single relation 
between an individual right-holder (the employee or worker) and an 
43. On the notion of individual rights as “building blocks” for a collective right to organize, see Lord 
Wedderburn, “Employment Protection Act 1975: Collective Aspects” (1976) 39:2 Mod L Rev 169.
44. Alan Bogg & Cynthia Estlund, “Freedom of Association and the Right to Contest: Getting Back 
to Basics” in Alan Bogg & Tonia Novitz, eds, Voices at Work (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 
141.
45. Supra note 43.
46. Ernest Weinrib, Corrective Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 4.
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individual wrongdoer (the employer), and the remedy aims to restore the 
position of the right-holder by repairing the wrong. This is marked by 
private law-style “correlativity,” namely that “the liability of the defendant 
is always a liability to the plaintiff. Liability consists in a legal relationship 
between two parties each of whose position is intelligible only in light 
of the other’s.”47 The UK statute posits rights for individual workers and 
employees not to be subjected to a detriment, dismissed or to have offers 
made to them on a range of protected grounds including trade union 
membership, participation in trade union activities at an appropriate time, 
and use of union services. This legal structure is highly individualistic. 
The right-holder is an individual worker or employee.48 The trade union 
is not a separate right-holder with legally protected interests. It can only 
benefit derivatively from the enforcement of individual rights. Secondly, 
the trade union does not have standing to enforce the individual’s statutory 
right not to be victimized. Nor is there a public agency that assists in the 
enforcement of these fundamental rights. The claim must be brought by 
the individual worker or employee, and she has the exclusive normative 
power to determine whether to pursue it. The UK legal structure is highly 
convergent with a private law model.
By contrast, the US model is based upon an “unfair labor practice” 
regime, the broad structure of which was introduced in sections 7 and 
8 of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. Section 7 specifies the 
fundamental associative rights of employees in the following terms:
“employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or 
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives 
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for 
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”49 
These fundamental associative rights are protected by a set of “unfair 
labor practices” set out in section 8. These provisions are administered by 
an administrative agency, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), 
which adjudicates “unfair labor practice” complaints and determines the 
remedies for violations under section 8.
The right-holder under this labour relations regime is the individual 
employee. The legal procedure is initiated by the filing of an “unfair labor 
practice” charge, and this charge may be filed by “any person, even a 
47. Ibid at 18.
48. “Workers” are protected from “detriment” and “offers” under the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations Consolidation Act (TULRCA) 1992, ss 145A, 145B and 146. “Employees” are protected 
from refusal of access to employment and dismissal under TULRCA 1992, ss 137 and 152.
49. National Labor Relations Act, 29 USCA § 7 (1935).
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stranger to the dispute” and so “need not be filed by the person actually 
aggrieved or adversely affected by the alleged misconduct.”50 As such, the 
standing rules for enforcement of “unfair labor practices” are very wide. 
In this respect, it departs from the tight private law structure of the UK 
right to organize, based on correlativity between claimant and defendant. 
It is for the regional directors of the Board, acting under the authority 
of the General Counsel, to determine whether an “unfair labor practice” 
complaint should be issued against the party alleged to have breached 
the legal provisions. At this stage, the General Counsel “has plenary 
authority to determine whether an unfair labor practice complaint should 
be issued.”51 If the complaint is issued, the prosecutorial wing of the Board 
(consisting of lawyers for the General Counsel) will represent the charging 
party in proceedings before a separate adjudicative wing of the Board, 
although a charging party may also participate in those proceedings and be 
represented by its own lawyers.52 
This approach reflects the distinctive historical origins of the US 
statutory structure, where the Wagner Act was “enacted in an era of 
swelling confidence in the administrative state” hence “it contains no 
private right of action.”53 The decision to avoid private law enforcement 
perhaps also reflected ambivalence on the part of workers and trade 
unions about judicial involvement in the adjudication of labour relations 
disputes.54 According to Godard, 31 per cent of filings were made by 
individuals, compared with 69 percent by trade unions.55 In this way, the 
enforcement of freedom of association rights under US law is both highly 
statist (reflected in the General Counsel’s pivotal role) and, in practice, 
highly collectivist (reflected in the de facto enforcement role of trade 
unions in “unfair labor practice” proceedings).
In Canada, there is a wider variation in legal structure, reflecting the 
fact that labour relations are regulated at the provincial as well as the 
federal level. The Ontario model of “unfair labour practices” provides 
a typical example of the Canadian statutory model. Section 70 of the 
Ontario Labour Relations Act 1995 provides that “[n]o employer or 
50. Robert Gorman & Matthew Finkin, Basic Text on Labor Law: Unionization and Collective 
Bargaining, 2nd ed (St Paul MN: West Publishing, 2004) at 10.
51. William B Gould, A Primer on American Labor Law, 4th ed (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004) 
at 60.
52. Ibid at 61.
53. Cynthia Estlund, Regoverning the Workplace: From Self-Regulation to Co-Regulation (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2010) at 39 [Regoverning the Workplace].
54. Ibid.
55. John Godard, Trade Union Recognition: Statutory Unfair Labour Practice Regimes in the USA 
and Canada (London: Department for Trade and Industry, 2004) at 18.
“Labour Law is a Subset of Employment Law” Revisited 497
employers’ organization and no person acting on behalf of an employer 
or an employers’ organization shall participate in or interfere with the 
formation, selection or administration of a trade union or the representation 
of employees by a trade union or contribute financial or other support to 
a trade union.”56 This has been interpreted as positing an “institutional” 
right for trade unions, rather than any “personal” right of an individual 
employee.57 Section 72, by contrast, is concerned with the protection of 
employees’ rights. It provides inter alia that no employer “shall refuse to 
employ or to continue to employ a person, or discriminate against a person 
in regard to employment or any term or condition of employment because 
the person was or is a member of a trade union or was or is exercising any 
other rights under this Act.” This envisages a complementary structure of 
individual and collective rights, recognizing the artificiality of severing 
those elements in many disputes involving trade union victimization.58
Individuals do not have standing to enforce the section 70 unfair labour 
practice provision. Since this is an “institutional” right of trade unions, 
enforcement of that right is confined to trade unions rather than individual 
employees. While employees have standing to enforce their own rights 
under section 72, the trade union also has standing to pursue complaints 
on behalf of affected employees. In situations of anti-union victimization 
against individual employees, in practice the trade union will usually seek 
enforcement of “institutional” rights under section 70 and “personal” 
rights under section 72. In this way, the Ontario legislation operates rules 
of standing that are both collective and individual. While individuals have 
no standing to enforce “institutional” rights, the legislation recognizes 
the vital role of trade unions performing an enforcement role on behalf 
of affected employees. This offers a pragmatic response to the practical 
difficulties of individuals being required to enforce their own “personal” 
rights in situations where the employer is hostile towards unionization.
This brief overview indicates the complexity of the individual-
collective distinction. For example, the well-documented failings of the US 
system are significantly attributable to the weak individual remedies and 
legal enforcement regime where employees are dismissed with impunity. 
In this vein, Cynthia Estlund has posed the following question of US law: 
“What if labor law had kept up with the times and added a private right of 
action for anti-union discrimination that the law already condemns? We 
might have had a ‘common law’ of anti-union discrimination, with cross-
56. Labour Relations Act, 1995, SO 1995, c 1, Schedule A.
57. James Mically Clock #2216 v Board of Governors, [1991] OLRB Rep  734.
58. Canadian Paperworkers Union (CPU) v International Wallcoverings, [1983] OLRB Rep 1316.
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fertilization from other wrongful discharge doctrines.”59 On this approach, 
a strongly enforced private right of action for anti-union discrimination, 
with effective remedies for victimized individuals, should be viewed as 
integral to a well-functioning labour relations regime. This provides a 
strong example of how employment law could be a precondition of an 
effective system of labour law. This is not inconsistent with also recognizing 
a strong public dimension to the enforcement of private rights of action. 
This could consist in giving trade unions or public agencies opportunities 
to provide material support to the individual right-holder or even to pursue 
the rights-violation on her behalf.60 It is a strength of the Canadian model 
that it blends the individual and the collective in some of its labour codes. 
We also begin to see the complexity of “public” and “private” in 
different legal approaches to the “personal scope” of labour rights. One 
of the fundamental contemporary issues in freedom of association is the 
exclusion of certain forms of personal work relations, sectors or occupations 
from the scope of legal protection. In English law, legal responses to 
unjustified exclusion focused predominantly on the refinement of private 
law tests as a basis for characterizing the “true agreement” between the 
parties.61 The gateway into legal protection in UK law is that X works as 
an “employee” or a “worker” under a contract with the employer. This has 
caused difficulties in situations where the employer uses comprehensive 
written documentation to present the working arrangements as self-
employment, which may be incompatible with employee or worker status 
necessary to qualify for legal protection. The English courts have deployed 
a “purposive” sham doctrine, which has allowed them to disregard written 
terms where these are inconsistent with the “true agreement” between the 
parties.62 Although the sham doctrine can be unpredictable in difficult cases, 
it marks the emergence of a worker-protective private law approach that 
is properly located within employment law, and upon which (collective) 
labour law protections depend.63 In Canada, by contrast, legal challenges 
to the formal exclusion of certain categories such as agricultural workers 
have been pursued through constitutional litigation using the Canadian 
59. Estlund, Regoverning the Workplace, supra note 53 at 40.
60. It does not follow that a trade union or public agency should enjoy an unfettered normative 
power to waive or extinguish an individual claim against the wishes of that individual.
61. See eg Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher, [2011] UKSC 41.
62. Ibid.
63. It should be noted that “employment status” cases in the UK are now being influenced by 
equality-type arguments, building upon fundamental rights jurisprudence under the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Article 14. For a recent example, see Gilham v Ministry of Justice 
(Protect intervening), [2019] UKSC 44, which extended whistleblowing protections to District Judges 
using equality arguments.
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Charter’s protection of general freedom of association.64 Both “private” 
(in the UK) and “public” (in Canada) legal strategies have enjoyed 
some moderate success in securing inclusion for excluded workers. The 
choice of legal strategy reflects the constitutional differences between 
these two countries, and the extent to which fundamental labour rights 
are constitutionally protected (as in Canada) or are matters of statutory 
interpretation (as in the UK).
In sum, the arguments in “Subset” emphasize an important dimension 
of collective action that may have been underappreciated at the time the 
piece was written. This is the indispensability of basic individual rights 
as a foundation for more developed collective structures and institutions. 
Or, to use Langille’s terminology, employment law is the “set” and labour 
law the “subset.” This basic substrate has grown in significance as new 
forms of work, such as “gig work,” have propagated. This has exposed 
the important intersection between employment law and labour law, 
particularly in the fundamental issue of the identity of the work contract 
and the exclusion of certain groups (ie the self-employed or agricultural 
workers) from the scope of collective bargaining statutes.
These issues also highlight a difficulty with Langille’s general claim 
that “public” values should have priority over “private” values. This brief 
discussion reveals the difficulty, which is that the “public” and “private” 
interact in myriad complex ways. Kit Barker has emphasized that there 
are “many (not one) private/public distinctions at stake.”65 It is important 
to be sensitive to these distinctions when the concepts are being invoked. 
We should be skeptical about assigning a global normative priority to 
the “public,” without understanding the sense in which “public” is being 
used, and how it is being contrasted with “private.” In developing his 
framework, Barker refers to a helpful typology set out in the work of 
Michaels and Jansen.66 Drawing upon this framework, a key argument in 
“Subset,” what might be described as the “primacy of employment law,” 
does not straightforwardly correspond to the “primacy of public values.” 
Employment law is “private” in the sense that it often allocates rights 
to individual right-holders, and the infringement of those rights by the 
employer duty-bearer is treated as a matter of corrective justice. It is also 
“private” in that it does not generally regulate relations between the citizen 
and the state, but citizens in their private capacities. Many of the doctrines 
64. See, eg, Ontario (Attorney General) v Fraser, 2011 SCC 20.
65. Barker, supra note 8 at 20.
66. Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, “Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, Globalization, 
Privatization” (2006) 54:4 Am J Comp L 843, discussed in Barker, supra note 8 at 20-21.
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being developed, such as the English “sham” doctrine or the recent use of 
unconscionability in the employment context in Canada,67 have their roots 
in private law doctrines and categories. 
Employment law also has important “public” aspects. Many individual 
employment rights are justified in part by their contribution to public 
goods, as well as the interest of the individual right-holder. For example, 
the right to a decent wage could be understood as being justified in part 
by its contribution to a public good, the maintenance of a public culture of 
decent work. Employment law is also “public” in the sense that the rights 
are usually implemented through statute, administered by special tribunals 
rather than ordinary courts, with those rights sometimes enforced at the 
initiative of public officials. Also, as private law doctrines are developed 
and applied in their encounter with statutory employment rights, there is a 
“constitutionalization” of private law as issues such as employment status 
determination are infused with public constitutional values. To understand 
employment law, and its relationship with labour law, we would do 
better to keep both the private and public dimensions in view, rather than 
assigning blanket priority to one or the other.
III. The public and private in employment law: Enforcement 
architectures 
The second dimension of “Subset” focuses on legal procedures, and 
modes of enforcement and adjudication. Langille observes that “the most 
overlooked aspect of the effort to bring a minimum of concern and respect 
to the employment relationship is the substantial institutional structure and 
powerful enforcement mechanisms established under the various pieces of 
legislation.”68 This structure provides for powerful public support for the 
enforcement of employment rights. In Nova Scotia, for example, Langille 
set out the main features of that legislation, which 
“compels employers to keep records, gives broad powers to public 
officials to investigate and attempt to settle complaints (or on their own 
motion) and to make binding orders, subject to the right of the employer 
to appeal to a higher tribunal. If the employer does contest the order the 
employee is represented by a public official.”69 
In this way, the enforcement mechanisms of employment law reveal an 
interesting hybridity of private law and public law. Protective employment 
statutes allocate primary rights to employees, and infringements of those 
67. Heller v Uber Technologies Inc, 2019 ONCA 1 [Heller]. And see now Uber Technologies Inc v 
Heller, 2020 SCC 16.
68. Langille, supra note 1 at 211.
69. Ibid.
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primary rights generate reparative obligations on the employer duty-bearer, 
enforceable through a public institution such as a court or tribunal. Unlike 
ordinary private law rights, however, public officials also have a central 
role in enforcing employment rights. They might initiate investigations 
of breaches, pursue enforcement actions against recalcitrant employers, 
and even provide representation to the employee where the employer 
contests the binding order made against it. It is common to see labour 
inspectorates charged with the public task of promoting compliance with 
labour standards. It would be more surprising to see “torts inspectorates” 
charged with the public responsibility to promote compliance with the 
private rights protected through the law of torts. Therein lies a most 
interesting puzzle.
Langille also provides important reflections on the role of arbitration 
and the “duty of fair representation” in Canadian labour law. Langille is 
broadly supportive of the central role of arbitration in the interpretation and 
enforcement of collective agreements. He also supports the proposition 
that arbitrators should integrate relevant statutory material into the 
interpretation of collective agreements. This would seem to follow from 
his commitment to vindicating public values against private interests. 
Here, the public values are represented in general legislation, and private 
values are represented by the autonomy of the collective bargaining parties 
to pursue their own interests in a private contractual process. 
The overlap between statutory standards and collectively agreed norms 
is particularly problematic where the labour code defers to the remedies 
provided in the collective agreement. This is because the employee may be 
deprived of the normative power to pursue the grievance. The trade union 
may elect not to pursue the employee’s grievance, though this election is 
subject to a “duty of fair representation.” In this situation, Langille asks 
several questions:
If it is impossible to contract out of these acts, how is it possible to deny 
the employee the right to pursue his remedy by the side wind of the 
application of the duty of fair representation? Is it possible for a trade 
union not to pursue a statutory right and yet not be in breach of that 
duty? Can the statutory right be traded or balanced off, as we recognize 
individual claims to collective agreement rights properly may be?70 
Langille argues persuasively that the union’s duty of fair representation 
should be shaped by statutory policies in the relevant legislation. This 
would mean that where fundamental rights were protected through statute, 
70. Ibid at 227.
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such as equal pay or the right to refuse work in the face of imminent 
danger, the employee (rather than a third party such as a trade union) 
should possess the normative power to seek redress through adjudication. 
This reveals the shifting nature of public and private values. For the 
repositioning of the normative power so that it rests with the primary right-
holder, the employee herself, is strongly characteristic of the architecture 
of private law and the values of corrective justice.
Enforcement is now one of the most difficult and controversial areas 
in contemporary labour law. We will consider two such examples drawn 
from UK and Canadian law. The first example is the growing significance 
of arbitration clauses in individual employment contracts. These clauses 
provide a mechanism for contracting out of public courts, channeling 
disputes about public statutory rights into private arbitration. In more 
extreme forms, they also provide a substitute for capital mobility so 
that transnational firms can escape the regulatory requirements within 
particular jurisdictions through “choice of law” clauses determining the 
applicable law. We might describe this as the phenomenon of juridical 
mobility, which is more frictionless than capital mobility. The second 
example is the political attack on substantive labour rights through the 
tightening of procedural law. This enables a de facto deregulation of 
employment rights, while the substantive law on the statute books remains 
untouched. An example of this is provided by the UK’s recent experience 
with tribunal fees for claimants, the effect of which was to decimate the 
individual enforcement of employment law in the UK. 
Enforcement identifies a fundamental way in which the private and 
public are inseparably linked: “Public institutions such as courts are 
required for private rights to be determined, declared and coercively 
enforced as a system. The basic function of these institutions is, nonetheless, 
to systematize and make those rights omnilateral.”71 This linkage between 
private rights and public adjudication has been a central topic in some 
recent work in private law theory. Here I focus on the work of Arthur 
Ripstein72 and John Gardner,73 and their reflections on the role of public 
courts in private law. 
In Private Wrongs, Ripstein explains the role of public courts in 
the light of his basic commitment to private rights as a scheme of equal 
freedom. The plaintiff enjoys an unfettered normative power to decide 
whether to seek redress in court in situations where a wrong has been 
71. Barker, supra note 8 at 13.
72. Arthur Ripstein, Private Wrongs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
73. John Gardner, From Personal Life to Private Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
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perpetrated against her. Why does the state take no stand on whether her 
rights should be vindicated and corrective justice restored? After all, a 
world in which fewer private wrongs are committed would be a better 
world, would it not? The answer, for Ripstein, lies in a feature of private 
rights in general. The wronged party’s power to see reparation in a court 
of law is a corollary of the position that “the state takes no position on 
whether you should exercise your power.”74 As with the exercise of 
primary rights, so it is with the power to vindicate those rights if they are 
infringed. The state stands ready to protect those rights if called upon to do 
so, but enforcement must be at the plaintiff’s initiative. The injured party is 
left free “to decide whether to stand” on her infringed rights.75 She might 
decide to accept an apology. Or she might decide that litigation isn’t worth 
the hassle. Or she might agree through contract to submit to a cheap and 
expeditious form of private dispute resolution, such as private arbitration. 
All of this is left to the plaintiff to decide. To return to our earlier example, 
that is why there is no “torts inspectorate” to encourage victims to seek 
legal redress against tortfeasors. 
Ripstein also explains how a scheme of private rights is dependent 
upon a system of public courts. The plaintiff and defendant are each 
in charge of themselves. Where the plaintiff alleges that she has been 
wronged by the defendant, that remains an allegation “until a third party 
with authority over both the plaintiff and the defendant has resolved the 
dispute on its merits.”76 This means that the state has an “obligation and 
entitlement to set up institutions for making, applying, and enforcing 
law.”77 Not only do courts provide an authoritative resolution of the 
dispute between plaintiff and defendant. They also provide authoritative 
determinations of the relevant law, the provision of which is a public good 
for all citizens.78 In this way, a comprehensive system of private arbitration 
could not provide a satisfactory substitute for a system of authoritative 
public courts. Ripstein also recognizes that there may sometimes be good 
reasons to replace private rights with alternative mechanisms of public 
protection (for example, workplace safety insurance).79 Nevertheless, 
where X’s entitlement is a private right, the ability for an individual 
plaintiff to opt into private arbitration is a corollary of Ripstein’s general 
approach to private rights and normative powers. Furthermore, where X’s 
74. Ripstein, supra note 72 at 271.
75. Ibid at 272.
76. Ibid at 273.
77. Ibid at 289.
78. Ibid at 14.
79. Ibid at 292.
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entitlement is a private right, it would be wrong to give a third party any 
power over the enforcement of that entitlement.
In From Personal Life to Private Law, John Gardner recognizes 
the “radically discretionary” character of the plaintiff’s power to decide 
whether to pursue the defendant through law.80 Indeed, Gardner regards 
this aspect of private law as something of a puzzle. The plaintiff can decide 
to sue the defendant on the most spurious of grounds. If she decides to 
do so, she can bring the awesome machinery of the state to bear on the 
defendant, through the medium of public courts. Gardner rejects the idea 
that this feature can be explained and justified through an appeal to personal 
freedom. Indeed, he characterizes it as “a typically illiberal arrangement” 
for “however stupid, she can dignify her stupidity with the authority of the 
court and foist it thereby on the defendant” in legal proceedings.81 Can this 
special position of the plaintiff, the legal system’s chosen “enforcer” of 
her own primary rights, be justified other than through the plaintiff’s own 
freedom?
According to Gardner, the “tertiary right” of a plaintiff against others 
“that they not usurp her in asserting or enforcing” her primary right (and 
secondary right to reparation following its infringement) is structurally 
very different to her primary and secondary rights.82 That is because the 
duties corresponding to the tertiary right are not, like the primary and 
secondary rights, duties imposed on the defendant. These “tertiary duties” 
are duties on the rest of us either to not obstruct or even to positively 
support the plaintiff in vindicating her own rights against the defendant. 
According to Gardner, the special role of the plaintiff as an “enforcer” of 
her own rights in the legal system is justified on the basis of a range of 
public good arguments: (i) the coercive character of the public judicial 
system incentivizes defendants to engage with claims of wrongdoing, and 
this could promote alternative (cheaper, less stressful) processes for the 
defendant to repair the wrong against the plaintiff; (ii) prosecuting officials 
“may be more expensive, more erratic, less nimble, and/or less sensitive 
to the niceties of the situation than the plaintiff…Sometimes (eg when 
intimidation of the plaintiff is likely) the pursuit of a wrongdoer by a 
prosecutor may serve the person wronged, as well as the rest of us, better”; 
(iii) third-party intervention might exacerbate the dispute, although in 
certain situations skilled intervention could defuse the situation; (iv) the 
distribution of enforcement powers to private individuals militates against 
80. Gardner, supra note 73 at 201.
81. Ibid at 202.
82. Ibid at 207.
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concentrations of power in public officials, and this “contributes to the 
flourishing of the rule of law by ensuring that the law and its institutions 
do not become a tool only of an oligarchy of officials.”83 We should note 
the public and instrumental character of these considerations, all of which 
go to support an ostensibly “private” power of the plaintiff to seek legal 
redress.
These engagements from Ripstein and Gardner offer important 
perspectives on some themes from “Subset.” Take, for instance, the idea 
that third parties such as trade unions might have standing to enforce (or 
perhaps even waive) enforcement of the employee’s rights. The idea of third 
party standing to enforce private rights would be scarcely comprehensible 
on Ripstein’s account. By contrast, there is more space in Gardner’s 
account to accommodate such an arrangement. The involvement of a third-
party enforcer might incentivize employers to engage with the allegation 
of wrongdoing without the expense of litigation. Trade union officials 
are less likely to be intimidated by employers, and the special expertise 
of trade unions in dispute resolution mean that there are advantages in 
giving them standing rights. A role for trade union enforcers serves the 
rule of law by diffusing undue concentrations of power, particularly in 
public enforcement agencies. There is fertile scope for experimentation 
with hybrid enforcement models coordinated between public and private 
actors. For example, where enforcement strategies opt for a “prosecution 
model” over a “litigation model,”84 we might prefer to disperse power 
by giving trade unions and employees opportunities to pursue private 
prosecutions or to seek judicial review of an enforcement agency’s 
decision not to prosecute. We might also prefer enforcement models that 
adopt a “prosecution model” alongside a “litigation model,” rather than to 
treat the “prosecution model” as a substitute, so that individuals do not feel 
disempowered in the enforcement process.85 This provides an extra reason 
to be wary of elevating the “public” over the “private” at a methodological 
level, not least because it risks obscuring the vital contribution of recent 
work in private law theory to advancing our understanding of enforcement 
issues in employment law.
We will examine two recent examples that illustrate this complex 
interplay between “public” and “private” in enforcement: the use of 
83. Ibid at 210.
84. Ibid at 209.
85. In this respect, the UK law on health and safety opted for a “prosecution model” and extinguished 
the ability of individuals to seek civil reparation, with deregulatory effects. See Michael Ford, “The 
Criminalization of Health and Safety at Work” in Alan Bogg, Jennifer Collins, Mark Freedland & 
Jonathan Herring, eds, Criminality at Work (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020) 409.
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arbitration clauses in employment contracts and the approach of the 
Canadian courts in Uber v Heller,86 and the regime of tribunal fees in the 
UK, which was struck down as unlawful by the UK Supreme Court.87 
Heller involved a legal challenge to a mandatory arbitration clause 
in a contract between Uber and an UberEATS driver, and whether there 
needed to be a mandatory stay of court proceedings under the Arbitration 
Act 1991 given the existence of the arbitration clause. The arbitration 
clause required disputes to be referred to arbitration in Amsterdam, which 
would be subject to the law of the Netherlands. The clause also required 
the payment of US $14,500 as an administrative cost. The appellant earned 
$20,800–$31,200 per year before taxes and expenses were deducted. Nor 
did the fee include other costs likely to be incurred in an arbitration, such 
as travel to Amsterdam, accommodation, and legal representation. The 
Ontario Court of Appeal determined that the arbitration clause was invalid 
for two reasons. First, it constituted an unlawful “contracting out” of the 
protective provisions of the Employment Standards Act 2000. Second, the 
arbitration clause was invalid based on the unconscionability doctrine’s 
necessary conditions: 
1. a grossly unfair and improvident transaction; 
2. a victim’s lack of independent legal advice or other suitable advice;
3. an overwhelming imbalance in bargaining power caused by the 
victim’s ignorance of business, illiteracy, ignorance of the language 
of the bargain, blindness, deafness, illness, senility, or similar 
disability; and 
4. the other party’s knowingly taking advantage of this vulnerability.88 
The Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Heller represented a powerful 
countermovement against the use of arbitration clauses in employment 
contracts. These arbitration clauses have sought to exploit the differences 
in worker-protection between different labour law systems. Legal norms 
are configured as an object of consumer choice, like shoes or sofas. In 
the most extreme versions, employment contracts may provide for 
compulsory and individualized private arbitration so that employment 
disputes are channeled out of the system of public courts entirely.89 In the 
US, the public courts have themselves been complicit in this privatization 
86. Heller, supra note 67.
87. R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51, [2017] 3 WLR 409 [UNISON]; Michael Ford, 
“Employment Tribunal Fees and the Rule of Law: R (Unison) v Lord Chancellor in the Supreme 
Court” (2018) 47: 1 Indus  LJ 1.
88. Heller, supra note 67 at para 60.
89. Matthew W Finkin, American Labor And The Law: Dormant, Resurgent, And Emergent 
Problems (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International BV, 2019) at 54-62.
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of public justice.90  The unconscionability argument in Heller can be 
understood as a private law response to the problem of arbitration, focusing 
on the exploitative contracting behaviour of powerful corporate actors 
such as Uber. This bargaining context (the gross substantive unfairness 
of the contractual term, the extreme imbalance of bargaining power, the 
absence of legal advice, knowingly taking advantage of the weaker party’s 
contractual vulnerability) meant that the contract term was invalid. 
By contrast, the statutory “contracting out” argument in Heller 
connected with wider public good arguments against a system of private 
arbitration, independently of private law concerns about the specific 
bargain itself. For example, Finkin has argued that there are strong policy 
arguments in favour of an exclusive jurisdiction for public courts: “the 
vindication of legal rights is best reposed in a public body: one whose 
competence in the law is assured, whose impartiality is above question, 
whose process is transparent, whose decisions are accessible and have 
broader legal and communal impact and which is subject to comprehensive 
public accountability.”91 Where private arbitration clauses are utilized so 
extensively that litigation in public courts disappears, the overall system 
of public justice and the rule of law is undermined. In this situation, the 
public good would justify a curtailment of private arbitration clauses even 
where there is no bargaining unfairness in the individual employment 
contract.92 There is perhaps more space in Gardner’s account of private 
law enforcement than Ripstein’s to accommodate these public good 
arguments, although Ripstein is of course astute to the distinctive virtues 
of a system of public justice through courts.
A majority of the SCC upheld the decision of the Ontario Court 
of Appeal but the justices did so for different reasons. It is possible to 
identify two broad approaches in the majority, what could be described as 
a “contractual” approach and a “constitutional” approach. Justices Abella 
and Rowe (Chief Justice Wagner and Justices Moldaver, Karakatsanis, 
Martin and Kasirer concurring) exemplified the contractual approach. 
90. See Epic Systems Corp v Lewis, 138 S Ct 1612 (2018), where a majority of the US Supreme Court 
upheld the preclusion of group claims by mandatory arbitration clauses in employment contracts.
91. Matthew Finkin, “Privatization of Wrongful Dismissal Protection in Comparative Perspective” 
(2008) 37:2 Indus LJ 149 at 164.
92. This is not just a concern in the employment field. Barker, supra note 8 at 18, notes that in the 
US “civil cases have all but vanished from the courts.”  This creates difficulties for a system of public 
justice and the Rule of Law (ibid at 18-19). John Gardner also observes that while “courts do not have 
an institutional monopoly on doing justice,” private arbitrators might.“[W]hat the courts do have an 
institutional monopoly on is doing justice according to law.” This represents another public good that 
must be realized through courts and cannot be realized by private arbitration: John Gardner, “Legal 
Justice and Ludic Fairness,” online (pdf):  <https://johngardnerathome.info/pdfs/justicefairness-
madrid.pdf> [perma.cc/8TED-Y47F].
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They did so on the basis that the arbitration clause was unconscionable and 
hence invalid. Justice Brown favoured a “constitutional” approach. He 
rejected the unconscionability analysis of Justices Abella and Rowe on the 
basis that it expanded the doctrine beyond its proper limits, leading to an 
unacceptable degree of uncertainty for contracting parties. Justice Brown 
instead decided the case on the narrower ground of public policy. The 
effect of this arbitration clause was to exclude Mr. Heller’s access to an 
appropriate forum for a just determination of his legal rights. In impeding 
access to justice, the clause undermined the rule of law. This invoked 
an established head of public policy, preventing ouster of the courts in 
the determination of legal rights, and this was sufficient to impugn the 
disputed clause in Heller. It did so without any wider disruptive effects on 
the negotiation of contracts, which depend upon a stable and predictable 
framework of legal rules.
The doctrine of unconscionability favoured by the majority was based 
upon two elements: an (i) inequality of bargaining power resulting in (ii) 
an improvident transaction. It should be noted that this represents a wide 
approach to unconscionability. Since many employment contracts are now 
based on standard form written documentation, they might engage the 
“inequality of bargaining power” concern rather easily. The legal analysis 
would then shift to an enquiry into whether the specific term or overall 
bargain was “improvident.” By contrast, Justice Brown’s constitutional 
argument was based on the rule of law, and it connected with public good 
arguments against a system of private arbitration. This public rule of law 
argument is wider than concerns about the specific bargain itself. 
In focusing on the specific public policy issue at stake in the Heller 
dispute—the rule of law and effective access to a forum that can adjudicate 
disputes about legal rights justly and fairly—Justice Brown’s judgment 
provides a more tailored method for scrutinizing the proportionality of 
such clauses. Private arbitration would be permissible where it did not 
preclude access to justice. The mischief of the specific clause in Heller was 
that it was designed to make arbitration inaccessible to the weaker party—
the antithesis of access to justice. Justice Brown’s approach also avoids 
difficulties with the unconscionability approach where, for example, the 
relevant clause was accompanied by a transparent explanation available 
to the party before entering the contract. Here, the deficiencies in the 
contracting process may be resolved sufficiently to avoid unconscionability. 
The rule of law objection would still stand. Contractual approaches to the 
Heller mischief are always vulnerable to circumvention because strong, 
well-advised parties can configure the negotiation process to mitigate the 
procedural deficiencies just enough to evade the doctrine. The value of the 
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“constitutional” perspective is that it is better able to vindicate important 
public values, such as the rule of law, that would be missed by a private 
law focus on procedural fairness in the individual bargaining process.
The arbitration clause in Heller imposed exorbitant costs on the 
Uber driver, which would have had the predictable effect of pricing her 
out of access to justice. It is bad enough when private employers do this. 
It is grave when governments do so. In the UK, a tribunal fee regime 
was implemented by the Coalition Government in 2013. It followed the 
publication of a Ministry of Justice consultation paper in January 2011 
setting out the Government’s intention to implement fees for Employment 
Tribunal (ET) and Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) claims.93  Tribunal 
claims dropped off a cliff following its introduction.94 The pattern of 
precipitous decline was certainly clear by the time of the second hearing in 
the Divisional Court.95 The rapid and drastic real-world impact of tribunal 
fees was probably beyond even the wildest dreams of its most fervent 
political supporters. Lord Reed concluded that “there has been a dramatic 
and persistent fall in the number of claims brought in ETs…of the order 
of 66-70%.”96 Furthermore, the remission scheme had not worked as 
expected, with the “proportion of claimants receiving remission…far 
lower than had been anticipated.”97 The Lord Chancellor’s discretionary 
power to remit fees had been exercised only rarely.98 The UKSC also 
referred to an Advisory, conciliation and arbitration service (Acas) survey, 
published in 2015,99 which found that a significant number of claimants did 
not pursue legal claims because of the practical unaffordability of fees.100 
The fee regime was struck down as unlawful by the UKSC, principally 
on the basis that it violated the common law fundamental right of access 
to a court. Prior to the UKSC decision, UNISON had lost three times in 
the lower courts. In the lower courts, no judge had been prepared to leap 
the slender evidential gap between the aggregate statistics on tribunal 
claims to the unaffordability of the fees for individual claimants. Since the 
behavioural pattern might be explained on the basis that claimants were 
93. UK, Ministry of Justice, Charging Fees in the Employment Tribunals and the Employment 
Appeal Tribunal (Consultation Paper) (London: December 2011).
94. For early academic criticism of the fees regime, see KD Ewing & J Hendy QC, “Unfair Dismissal 
Law Changes: Unfair?’” (2012) 41:1 Indus LJ 115.
95. R (Unison) v the Lord Chancellor [2014] EWHC 4198 (Admin); [2015] 2 CMLR 4.
96. UNISON, supra note 87 at para 39.
97. Ibid at para 43.
98. Ibid at para 44.
99. Ibid at paras 45-46, discussing Acas, Evaluation of Acas Early Conciliation 2015, Research 
Paper (2015), online (pdf): <https://www.acas.org.uk/research-and-commentary> [perma.cc/QSQ6-
5ZH2].
100. UNISON, supra note 87 at para 46.
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unwilling, as opposed to unable to pay, the regime was upheld as lawful. 
The legal focus on an individual’s ability to pay is focused on the position 
of the individual citizen vis-à-vis the public system of justice, and the 
individual citizen as a paying service-user. 
By contrast, the UKSC assessed the legality of the fee regime based 
on the rule of law as a common good for citizens in the polity. As such, 
access to a court was itself a fundamental right contributing to a public 
good, not merely a private amenity for individuals to pursue their legal 
grievances. There are interesting parallels here with Justice Brown’s 
judgment in Heller. As Lord Reed put it, “People and businesses need 
to know, on the one hand, that they will be able to enforce their rights 
if they have to do so, and, on the other hand, that if they fail to meet 
their obligations, there is likely to be a remedy against them. It is that 
knowledge which underpins everyday economic and social relations.”101 
This reflects an ideal of the rule of law as protecting the liberty of citizens 
under a system of constitutional government. The law must be “reliably 
enforced and fairly and consistently applied” so that civic independence 
is assured.102 The common law’s concern with freedom as independence 
is especially acute for employees and workers, for ineffective systemic 
enforcement entails that “the party in the stronger bargaining position will 
always prevail.”103
These constitutional principles emboldened the UKSC to approach the 
available evidence differently to the lower courts. The test for whether 
the Fees Order was ultra vires was whether there was a “real risk” that 
claimants would “effectively be prevented” from having access to the 
court.104 This displayed a welcome sensitivity to the real world occupied 
by workers. As such, the formula of “real risk” meant that it was not 
necessary to adduce “conclusive evidence” that people were prevented 
from bringing claims. The aggregate data was sufficient to establish 
a fall that was “so sharp, so substantial, and so sustained as to warrant 
the conclusion that a significant number of people who would otherwise 
have brought claims have found the fees to be unaffordable.”105 This was 
reinforced by Lord Reed’s observation that affordability must be decided 
101. Ibid at para 71.
102. TRS Allan, The Sovereignty of Law: Freedom, Constitution, and Common Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013) at 89. This has obvious affinities with republican work on freedom as 
non-domination, on which see Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
103. UNISON, supra note 87 at para 72. 
104. Ibid at para 87 [emphasis added].
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“according to the likely impact of the fees on behaviour in the real world.”106 
As such, the fees needed to be “reasonably” affordable, not theoretically 
affordable.107 Finally, Lord Reed drew attention to statutory rights where 
the corresponding remedies were either low monetary awards or even non-
pecuniary, such as the right to written statement of terms and conditions. In 
these circumstances, the costs of seeking justice would render its pursuit 
“futile or irrational.”108 Even where claimants were seeking to vindicate 
statutory rights with higher monetary awards, the difficulties in predicting 
a successful outcome, compounded by the shocking figures on non-
enforcement of ET awards, meant that enforcement was likely “irrational 
or futile” in many of these cases too.109 This undermined the public good 
represented by the effective general enforcement of each individual’s 
employment rights. 
These public systemic considerations were extremely important 
in justifying the Court’s conclusion that the fees regime was unlawful. 
Enforcement is a site where the “public” and the “private” intersect. The 
insight that systemic enforcement is a public good also supports the view 
that exclusive reliance on individual litigation, even without excessive 
court fees and supported by generous legal aid, is unlikely to be enough. 
Effective enforcement must be sensitive to a range of considerations. John 
Gardner’s recent work identifies the range of considerations relevant to 
this enquiry. It also identifies the limits of normative argument, for many 
of the final judgements will be informed by empirical work on the real 
world effects of specific models such as standing for trade union enforcers, 
the practical limitations of public agency enforcement in areas such as 
national minimum wage, blending criminal and civil law measures, and 
so forth. 
Conclusion: Employment law as a hybrid of private and public law  
The arguments in “Subset” have stood the test of time. They could even 
be regarded as ahead of their time. Individual employment rights have 
become increasingly important in providing a basic facilitative structure 
for collective activities in the workplace, particularly in precarious forms 
of work that appear to be excluded from standard labour law protections. 
There has been a greater willingness to use innovative private law 
arguments in litigation, for example the sham doctrine in the English 
106. Ibid at para 93.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid at para 96.
109. See further Abi Adams & Jeremias Prassl, “Vexatious Claims: Challenging the Case for 
Employment Tribunal Fees” (2017) 80:3 Mod L Rev 412.
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law on employment status or unconscionability in the Canadian Uber 
litigation. “Subset” also identified enforcement architectures as a central 
issue in employment and labour law. Over the last decade, issues around 
enforcement have moved to the centre of public policy discourse, and the 
arguments in “Subset” speak powerfully to our current challenges.
There is more difficulty in the claim that the “public” should have 
normative priority over the “private.” In fact, many of the arguments in 
“Subset” point towards a more nuanced understanding of the “public” and 
the “private.” It contemplates a richer and more complex vision, whereby 
public and private values intersect in a multiplicity of ways. Employment 
law, based upon corrective justice between employee right-holders and 
employer duty-bearers, partakes of the basic structural elements of private 
right. There is a dignity in being taken seriously as an individual bearer 
of rights in a public court.110 The enforcement of employment law, and 
particularly the involvement of actors other than the individual right-
holder in enforcement, inevitably engages questions that are more public in 
nature. In the course of reflecting on “Subset,” I have indicated some ways 
in which recent work in private law theory illuminates some of the most 
fascinating enforcement puzzles in modern employment law. We need to 
keep the “public” and the “private” in view, and give full recognition to the 
internal complexity of these ideas. To do otherwise is to do employment 
law (and the workers who benefit from its protection) a disservice.
In particular, it is important that labour lawyers reconnect with private 
lawyers so that scholars in both domains can learn from each other. It 
is also important that labour law theory is engaged with work in private 
law theory. In retrospect, it may be that Langille’s strong commitment 
to the “primacy of public values” was a rhetorical defence anticipating 
predictable criticisms that the “primacy of employment law” was a 
betrayal of collective and solidaristic values. While such worries on the 
author’s part would have been perfectly understandable, the criticism 
that the “primacy of employment law” is a betrayal would be wide of the 
mark. The spirit of its arguments should be read as expanding the circle 
of solidarity so that the “have-nots” sit at the centre of our discipline, 
exactly where they belong. Private law doctrines, values and theory can 
contribute to improving the position of the “have-nots,” recognizing their 
dignity as bearers of rights. As labour lawyers, we overlook those private 
law resources at our peril, and to the heavy cost of those most in need of 
protection. Yet this must always be tempered by a recognition that the 
public institutions of the state, such as courts and labour inspectorates, 
110. Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank, & Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
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must perform an important public role in securing the enforcement of 
workers’ fundamental rights. In employment law, at least, the public and 
the private stand or fall together. And employment law is best understood 
as a hybrid of private and public law.
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